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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FIREMAN'S INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANN LARSEN BROWN, Z I O N S
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A., a
corporation, and RUSSELL G. FULLMER,
Defendants,

Case No.
13670

RUSSELL G. FULLMER,
Cross-Complainant-Respondent,
vs.
ANN LARSEN BROWN,
Cross-Defendant-Appellant. J
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
The instant proceedings were brought by Russell G.
Fullmer, cross-complainant, hereinafter called "buyer"
to fix the amount he was required to pay to perform his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
real estate contract and to compel Ann Larsen Brown,
cross-defendant and appellant, hereinafter called "seller"
to convey title upon payment of the amount determined
to be due her since there was a dispute between the parties as to the amount due.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties entered into a uniform real estate contract
on April 1, 1971, concerning property at 724 Lake Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 84).
On September 21, 1971, the home on the premises
was destroyed by fire and the parties had a dispute as
to how the proceeds of the insurance on the home and
its contents should be distributed so the Fireman's Insurance Company interpleaded the parties and the dispute between the parties was tried and the Court determined that the $9,299.45 paid into Court by the insurance carrier should be distributed as follows: $8,000.00
as a credit on the aforesaid real estate contract, $1,099.45
to seller, and $200.00 to buyer (the first sum being for
insurance on the house and the latter two for coverage
of its contents) (R. 32, 33).
The Court in the above proceeding determined that
the balance due under the contract was $3,040.26 after
application of the aforesaid $8,000.00 with the payment
being then made on March 1, 1972 (R. 33, 34).
The contract required the buyer to pay $100.00 per
month on the 1st day of each month. The defendant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed and neglected to make the following payments due
under the contract:
April 1, 1972
$100.00
May 1, 1972
100.00
June 1, 1972
100.00
July 1, 1972
100.00
August 1, 1972
100.00
September 1, 1972
100.00
October 1, 1972
100.00
November 1, 1972
100.00
December 1, 1972
100.00
January 1, 1973
100.00
February 1, 1973
100.00
March 1, 1973
100.00
Thereupon the seller caused her attorney to serve a
"Notice to Quit" upon the buyer for his breaches of this
contract (Exhibit 2D). Service was made by the Salt
Lake County Sheriff on March 26, 1973. On March 28,
1973, the buyer's attorney wrote to seller's attorney saying that the service was invalid but if it were valid, he
assumed that buyer would contend as follows:
1. That the contract is not delinquent and, in
fact, is paid in advance.
2. That forfeiture of the contract would be unconscionable and thus not available as a
remedy in this case.
3. That in the event of forfeiture being elected,
the seller would be obligated to pay back the
buyer's equity in the property in accordance
with the principles set forth in Perkins v.
Spencer and subsequent case authority (Ex.
1-D).
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After further correspondence, buyer's attorney wrote
on April 12, 1973, saying, inter alia:
"Mr. Fullmer still takes the same position as stated
in my letter of March 28, 1973" (Exhibit 1-D, second
letter).
On May 11, 1973, seller's attorney wrote to her to
advise her that it would be to her advantage to allow the
$8,000.00 paid for March, 1972, to be applied to future
payments as the buyer's attorney was contending had
been done (Exhibit 7-D) and she acted in accordance
with that advice (R. 119).
The buyer did not make the payments due for the
months of April, May, June, July, August, September,
October, and November of 1973 (R. 117). On December
1, 1973, the buyer paid $1,000.00.
The buyer contended that the balance due under
the contract was $2,040.26 plus interest. The seller contended that the balance was $3,564.65 (R. 19, 20). Both
sidles claimed attorney's fees of $300.00 for services required by breach of the other.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court found that the principal balance due
on the contract after the $1,000.00 payment on December
1, 1973, was $2,040.26 and that upon payment of that
sum, together with interest of $399.00 to December 31,
1973, the seller was ordered to convey title to the subject
property. No attorney's fees were awarded to either
party.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Seller seeks to have the Decree of the court below
modified by having the principal balance determined to
be $3,564.65, the sum which would be due if the $8,000.00
paid in March, 1972, was actually applied to prepayments and by allowing seller $300.00 for attorney's fees
in the trial court and a reasonable sum for her fees on
appeal and for the costs of court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT BUYER HAD ELECTED
(BY HIS CONDUCT AND BY HIS ATTORNEY'S DECLARING ON HIS BEHALF)
THAT THE $8,000.00 FIRE INSURANCE
PROCEEDS BE APPLIED TO FUTURE
PAYMENTS RATHER THAN ON THE
PRINCIPAL BALANCE AS OF MARCH 1,
1972, AND THUS DETERMINED THE
PRINCIPAL BALANCE TO BE FAR LESS
THAN THE CORRECT AMOUNT.
In order for the buyer to avoid the obligation of
making monthly payments after a large payment than
the contract called for, he could elect to have the payment applied to future payments. The subject contract
provides that:
"The buyer, at his option at any time, may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments
upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage or contract by the buyer
herein assumed, such excess to be applied either
to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which
election must be made at the time the excess
payment is made" (Exhibit 1-P, Par. 4).
Quite understandably his attorney then asserted that
the $8,000.00 payment on March 1, 1972 should be applied to future payments (Exhibit 1-D) thus precluding
any sanctions being invoked against him. At the trial
his attorney contended he lacked actual authority from
his client to make such an election or reapplication of
the balloon payment but such action was the only course
which was consistent with buyer's conduct for twelve
months prior and seven months thereafter.
Seller contended below and contends here that the
parties mutually amended their contract by virtue of
their actions or impliedly through their respective counsel's actions. This amendment removed the restriction
that would prohibit buyer from retroactively applying
the $8,000.00 ballon payment to future payments. Buyer's non-payment of the monthly payments in the March
1972 to December 1973 period plus seller's acquiescence
therein had this effect, particularly in light of buyer's
attorney's response to seller's attorney's attempts to redress the breaches of contract prior to March 23, 1972
and most especially in light of seller's attorney's letter
of April 12, 1972, in which he stated inter alia: "the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$8,000.00 paid on March 1, 1972 applied to future payments" (Exhibit 1-P, second letter).
The Trial Court took the position that the matter
at issue was res judicata inasmuch as the Court in the
main action had applied the payment in question to the
principal balance and seller had not taken an appeal
from that decision (R. 11).
Seller does not question the correctness of the Court's
position as of December 30, 1972, when the appeal time
ran but nothing the Court ruled on in November, 1972,
could preclude the parties from thereafter amending their
contract so that payments made at a prior time would
be applied in a certain manner. (17 Am. Jur. 2d 924,
Contracts Sec. 458, et seq. and 46 Am. Jur. 2d 589, Judgments, Sec. 420.)
The same results can be predicated on the well-recognized principle of estoppel. Here seller asserted twelve
breaches of contract (actually seventeen were asserted but
in view of the Court's application of the $8,000.00 which
was subsequent to the first five monthly payments due,
the smaller number only is here applicable). Buyer denied through his attorney expressly and by his conduct
before and afterwards that he was not in default. Seller
acted in reliance upon his representation (that the
$8,000.00 was applied, at least so far as he was concerned,
or reapplied, regardless of the Court's decision in November, 1972, to future payments) to her detriment (by not
pursuing the remedy she sought to invoke in March,
1973) and thus buyer is now estopped to deny that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$8,000.00 was applied to future payments. (28 Am. Jur.
2d 640, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 35.)
If the $8,000.00 payment in March, 1972, was not
applied as prepayments of future installments, can there
be any doubt that in March, 1973, the buyer was in
breach of his contract (in fact had committed 12 breaches
of contract for that many monthly payments in the prior
year) when seller served him with notice that he was
and a demand that he remedy those breaches within six
days (Exhibit 2-D)? If that is so, how can it be justice
to allow buyer to evade the consequences of those breaches
and the eight subsequent breaches of monthly payments
during the period April, 1973, through December, 1973?
If the buyer was not in breach of his contract in
March, 1973 (as his attorney then contended on his behalf and which he confirmed by his not paying the
monthly payments otherwise due thereafter) or at the
time of the trial of this cause as buyer asserted at trial,
then how can the $8,000.00 be applied to future payments
other than in the manner computed on Exhibit 6-D? (It
should be noted that buyer's attorney admitted that he
didn't understand those computations but did not demonstrate the error thereof or explain to the court the manner
of application he contended would be correct if the sum in
question was applied to future installments. - See R. 123).
Appellant urges respondent's counsel in his brief to set
forth the mathematics he contends is correct if the
$8,000.00 was applied to future installments in the April,
1972 — November, 1973, period.
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CONCLUSION
The Decree below should be modified to require the
respondent to pay appellant the principal sum of $3,564.65
plus interest and $300.00 attorney's fees for services in
the trial court necessitated by respondent's breach of
contract plus an additional reasonable fee for services
on appeal plus costs.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for
CrosS'Defendant-Appellant
838 - 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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